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# **The Specification-based Validation of Reliable Multicast Protocol**

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## **Problem Report**

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## **Abstract**

Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) is a communication protocol that provides an atomic, totally ordered, reliable multicast service on top of unreliable IP multicasting. In this report, we develop formal models for RMP using existing automated verification systems, and perform validation on the formal RMP specifications. The validation analysis help identifies some minor specification and design problems. We also use the formal models of RMP to generate a test suite for conformance testing of the implementation. Throughout the process of RMP development, we follow an iterative, interactive approach that emphasizes concurrent and parallel progress of the implementation and verification processes. Through this approach, we incorporate formal techniques into our development process, promote a common understanding for the protocol, increase the reliability of our software, and maintain high fidelity between the specifications of RMP and its implementation.

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# **The Specification-based Validation of Reliable Multicast Protocol**

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>Chapter 1 Introduction</b>                          | <b>2</b>  |
| <b>Chapter 2 Reliable Multicast Protocol</b>           | <b>4</b>  |
| 2.1 Introduction to RMP                                | 4         |
| 2.2 RMP operations                                     | 5         |
| 2.3 RMP specifications                                 | 7         |
| <b>Chapter 3 Validation Strategy and Process Model</b> | <b>11</b> |
| 3.1 Introduction to protocol verification              | 11        |
| 3.2 Validation Methods and Our Early Experience        | 13        |
| 3.3 Theorem Prover                                     | 14        |
| 3.4 Model Checkers                                     | 17        |
| 3.4.1 SMV  | 17        |
| 3.4.2 Murphi   | 18        |
| 3.4.3 SPIN tool  | 20        |
| 3.5 Our Verification Strategy and Process Model        | 21        |
| <b>Chapter 4 Formal Models of RMP</b>                  | <b>25</b> |
| 4.1 Single-Site Murphi Model                           | 25        |
| 4.1.1 Some Simplifications                             | 25        |
| 4.1.2 Minimal State Variables                          | 27        |
| 4.1.3 State Transition Rules and Actions               | 28        |
| 4.1.4 Deadlock Avoidance                               | 29        |
| 4.1.5 Verification Analysis and State Invariants       | 32        |
| 4.1.6 Example Problems Found                           | 34        |
| 4.2 Multiple-Site SPIN Model                           | 37        |
| 4.2.1 The Need for Multiple-Site Model                 | 37        |
| 4.2.2 Some Simplifications                             | 38        |
| 4.2.3 Results  | 40        |
| 4.2.4 Future Directions                                | 43        |
| <b>Chapter 5 Test Generation</b>                       | <b>45</b> |
| 5.1 Conformance Testing and Testing Strategy           | 45        |
| 5.2 Test generation                                    | 46        |
| 5.3 Discussion   | 48        |
| <b>Chapter 6 Conclusion</b>                            | <b>49</b> |
| Bibliography   | 50        |
| Appendix   | 52        |

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## Chapter 1 Introduction

Many software engineering papers that discuss software quality begin with a phrase like “Software is always delivered late, over budget and full of errors.” [GANN94] As software becomes more sophisticated and complex, the task of producing correct, reliable and high-standard software remains difficult. As computers become cheaper, smaller, and more powerful, they become more pervasively spread out in modern society and play more important roles in every aspect of our lives. Since nowadays, most computers are interconnected by a network, a failure of software has far more reaching effect. It is clear that the need for building correct software systems become more demanding.

Formal verification and validation are effective ways to improve the software quality. However, the software industry is still reluctant to accept formal methods. Formal methods are perceived as impractical and not cost-effective. The reasons for this perception could be many-fold, but one obvious shortcoming of current practices is the separation of formal verification and the implementation activities in most software development processes. The formal methods are employed to check the logical consistency and completeness of designs and specifications, but this use has not been integrated into the entire life-cycle of software development. Formal models of a design are often developed and then abandoned in the later phases of development. When change occurs, we have to modify the code and the formal models independently. This not only increases the cost of development, but also deepen people’s impressions about the limits of formal methods.

In this report, we propose a new software development process that integrates formal methods into the entire life cycle of the software development. In the requirement and design phases, formal methods serve to model changes of software designs before the implementation and provide checks for completeness and consistency. During the coding, however, formal models can be refined along with the implementation of the specifications. For instance, pragmatic issue such as performance may require design decisions to be reconsidered. Any problem detected by formal models are feedback to designer and changes are reflected in the specifications. In parallel, implementation can be modified at the early stage. In the later life cycle, the same formal models can be used to generate a test suite for functional testing of the implementation. Using this approach, we can achieve high fidelity between the specifications, formal models, and the implementation. We have applied this process in the development of a complex internet protocol, and our experience suggests that this process helped us to improve the quality of our software. In our case, we used existing automated verification tools to validate the design of the protocol. During the implementation, we manipulate the models in order to analyze the protocol with respect to the desired properties. This analysis leads to discovery of some minor specification errors. In the later phases, we used the same formal models to generate a test suite for conformance testing of the protocol independently.

In Chapter 2, we introduce the reliable multicast protocol and describe the method for specifying the protocol operations. In Chapter 3, we review existing verification tools and outline our validation strategies based on these tools. We present our Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) formal models in Chapter 4. These formal models are based on different level of abstraction and are developed for different verification tools. They serve to verify different aspects of the specifications by using different levels of abstraction. In Chapter 5, we discuss test generation using the formal models. We conclude with a short discussion in Chapter 6.

## Chapter 2 Reliable Multicast Protocol

### 2.1 Introduction to RMP

Multicasting is a technique for passing copies of a single packet to a subnet of all possible destinations. The Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) is a communication protocol that provides a totally ordered, reliable, atomic multicast service on top of an unreliable IP multicast service. RMP is based on the set of reliable broadcast protocols presented by J. M. Chang and N. F. Maxemchuk [CHAN84]. RMP is designed to be a transport level protocol that provides reliable datagram delivery on top of a unicast or multicast unreliable datagram service. The main goal is to provide high throughput for totally ordered messages with low latency. It provides a transport mechanism by which a user can design and implement fully distributed, fault-tolerant applications without the need to deal with the lower level primitives of communication. Since RMP is aimed at providing a transport level service, performance is a high priority. RMP provides the following features [MONT94]:

- High throughput for totally ordered messages with low latency
- Virtual Synchrony
- Support of process group models
- Efficient changes to the process group
- Scalability of process groups
- Flexibility of choice for resiliency and fault-tolerance level

Here, by virtual synchrony, we mean that all sites will receive the same set of messages before and after a group membership change. In this way, a distributed application can execute as if its communication was synchronous, when it is actually asynchronous. Our RMP implementation shows excellent scalability: its single data sender throughput stays roughly constant as the number of destinations increases. RMP also offers different quality of services (QoS) levels: from unreliable, totally ordered, majority resilient to totally resilient.

## 2.2 RMP operations

RMP is operated in two distinct modes: a normal operation mode and a recovery mode. In the normal operation mode, RMP handles delivery of the data packets, token passing of the token, acknowledgment of data packets and membership changes. The protocol provides its primary services in the normal operation mode. The protocol switches from the normal operation mode into the recovery mode whenever a site detects a failure and tries to recover from the failure. After the new ring has been successfully reformed and synchronized to the same point, the protocol transits into the normal operation mode once again.

To illustrate the RMP operations, let us see a simple example. Supposed that a RMP token ring has been formed with three members: A, B and C. Suppose, the site B is the current token site. Assume that Site A sends a message with sequence number 1 and that almost simultaneously site C sends a message with sequence number 1 as well. Site B sees the message from site A just before the message from site C and therefore orders the two message by sending an ACK, ACK((A,1), (C,1), C,1). The ACK will be placed in the imposed order with a timestamp of 1. The data messages will also be placed in the order with timestamps of 2 and 3. These timestamps are implied because of the order they are placed in within the ACK. The new token site is C. If site C does not see any more data within a given time period and it




**EVENT ORDER:**

DATA(A,1)  
 DATA(C, 1)  
 ACK((A, 1), (C, 1), C, 1)  
 ACK(NULL, A, 1)  
 LCR(C< Remove, 2)  
 NL((C, 2), B, 5)

**Imposed Order:**

1 ACK((A,1), (C,1),C,1)  
 2 DATA(A, 1)  
 3 DATA(C, 1)  
 4 ACK(NULL, A, 4)  
 5 NL((C,2), B, 5)



**Figure 1. RMP normal operation example**

generates a token pass alarm and create a NULL ACK with timestamp 4 and pass the token to site A. Now suppose that sites C decides that it wants to remove itself from the ring. To perform this operation, it sends an LCR (List Change Request) that contains a sequence number of 2, ordering it with respect to the first message from the site C, and requesting site C to be removed from the ring. Because site A is the current token site, site A generates a new list, NL((C,2), B, 5), that does not contain site C in it and sends the new list to the ring. As a consequence of generating the new list, the token is passed to site B. The new list is ordered within the global ordering by being given a timestamp of 5. The new list that was generated corresponds with the LCR sent from site C with a sequence number of 2.

The above example explains how the protocol operates in the normal operation mode. If any site detects a failure during the normal operation mode, it will multicast a recovery start

packet and all sites will switch into the recovery operations on receiving the recovery start packet. The recovery process is a two step process. The first step is the generation and synchronization of a valid new token list. The second step is the installation of this new token list at each site. The fault-detecting site will act as a Reform Site and will send out the Recovery Vote packet to each site member. All other sites will act as slaving sites for the recovery process and respond to the Recovery Vote packet by sending their votes. Each site's vote packet contains their highest delivered timestamp, called SynchTSP. The Reform Site will keep a count of voters and send out new recovery packet if some sites fail to respond within a given time period. After all active site members send their votes and all sites synchronize to a common SynchTSP, the Reform Site will create a valid New List based on the collected votes. Upon receiving the New List packet, each slave site responds with a ACKNL packet and commit the New List in the current token ring. If the Reform Site receives all ACKNL packets from all members in the New List, the new ring has been successfully formed and consequently sends out a NULL ACK packet to start the rotation of token among the new token ring. During the process of the recovery, if an error happens or some sites fail to respond within certain time limit or within certain number of trials, the recovery will be aborted and every site be forced into Recovery Abort state. In this state, each site waits for a random time-out to start a new round of recovery operation. The overall goal is to provide the best possible reformation of the token ring upon the failure of certain sites. A more detailed description of the whole recovery operation can be found in the RMP distribution documents.

## **2.3 RMP specifications**

A complete specification of the protocol contains several parts. Among them are the description of the service provided by the protocol, the assumptions about the environments in which the protocol is executed, the vocabulary of messages used to implement the protocol, the format of each message and the procedure rules guarding the consistency of

message exchanges. The complete set of specifications can be found in the RMP distribution files [MONT94]. The verification and validation of the protocol is mainly concerned with the design and the validation of unambiguous sets of procedure rules governing the exchange of messages and the operation of the protocol.

Most protocols can be easily described as state machines. Design criteria can also be expressed in terms of desirable or undesirable protocol states and state transitions. A finite state machine is usually specified in the form of a transition table, which contains the current control state the machine is in, the condition on the environment of the machine (input signals), the transition effect on the environment (output signals), and the new state. The protocol is specified using a variant of SCR requirement specification table [HEN80] that we call mode table. The mode table for RMP specifies the policy that a network site used to respond to protocol events. Each operation is characterized by the current mode, the current event, and the conditions satisfied by the current state, the transition taken by the system, and the corresponding actions. In a complete RMP specifications, the system can be in any of the following 12 states: {TS, NTS, GP, PT, JR, LR, NIR, SR, CNL, SV, ACKNL, AR}. Each RMP site keeps its own three data structures: a Data Queue, an Ordering Queue and an Event Queue. Data Queue is a FIFO queue used to hold data packets as they arrive until they are delivered to application. The Ordering Queue is used for ordering data packets based on their timestamps. Events are dequeued from the Event Queues and serviced according to the specifications. There are 18 different events in RMP specifications: {DATA, ACK, NACK, CONF, NMD, NMA, NL, LCR, RecStart, RecVote, RecAbort, Failure, TPA, CTPA, RTA, MandLv, CommitNL, JoinReq}. The entire RMP specification describes the transition and corresponding actions for a site in any of the 12 states under the 18 different events. Typically, a site's actions include placing the data packet in the Data Queue, adding ACK packets in the Ordering Queue, updating the Ordering Queue, passing the token and multicasting or unicasting certain packets. Here

updating the Ordering Queue implies identifying the corresponding data packets from the Data Queue and sending out NACK packets for missing data packets. Another important action is passing the token. It is taken whenever a site is named as a token site and its ordering queue is consistent. If the token can be successfully passed, an ACK will be generated and Multicast to all members. Correspondingly, the token is passed to next site. A positive acknowledgment policy governs the sending of some packets: the source site will keep on retransmitting the packet until certain condition occurs. The details of this policy can be found in the RMP specifications.

**Table 1: RMP Normal Operation Specifications**

| Current State | Event | Current Conditions                               | Next State | Actions   |
|---------------|-------|--|------------|---|
| NTS           | ACK   | Not NamedTS                                      | PT         | Add ACK in OrderQ<br>Update OrderQ              |
| NTS           | ACK   | NamedTS<br>OrderQ Consistent<br>Token Passed     | TS         | Add ACK in OrderQ<br>Update OrderQ<br>PassToken |
| NTS           | ACK   | NamedTS<br>OrderQ Consistent<br>Token Not Passed | NTS        | Add ACK in OrderQ<br>Update OrderQ<br>PassToken |
| NTS           | ACK   | NamedTS<br>OrderQ Inconsistent                   | PT         | Add ACK to OrderQ<br>Update OrderQ              |

Table 1 shows a part of mode table for the protocol operations. The site is in the NTS (Not Token Site) state under the ACK event (the receipt of Acknowledgment packet). If an ACK event occurs and the site is not named as the next token site, the site will simply put ACK packet into Ordering Queue, update the Ordering Queue and stays in NTS state. If ACK

packet names the current site as the next token site, the current site will first put the packet in the Ordering Queue, update the Ordering Queue, and try to pass the token to the next site. If the token is successfully passed and the Ordering Queue is consistent up to the current time stamp, the site transits to PT (Passing Tokensite) state. If the Ordering Queue is consistent and the token has not been passed, it transits into TS (Token Site) state. Finally, if the site is named as the next token site by the ACK packet and the Ordering Queue is not consistent up to the current time stamp, it transits into GP (Getting Packets) state to wait for more packets to fill up the missing slots.

## Chapter 3 Validation Strategy and Process Model

### 3.1 Introduction to protocol verification

A well-structured protocol design should follow two common themes: simplicity and modularity. Simplicity means that the protocol can be built using a small number of well-designed and well-understood pieces. Modularity means that a complex function can be built from smaller pieces that interact in a well-defined and simple fashion. Each smaller piece is a light-weight protocol that can be separately developed, verified, implemented, and maintained. Generally, a well-formed protocol should have the following characteristics [HOLZ91]:

- **not over-specified:** it does not contain any unreachable or inexecutable code;
- **not under-specified:** it may not cause unspecified receptions during its execution;
- **bounded:** it can not overflow known system limits;
- **self-stabilizing:** if a transient error arbitrarily changes the protocol state, a self-stabilizing protocol always returns to a desirable state within a finite number of transitions, and resume normal operations;
- **self-adapting:** it can adapt, for instance, the rate at which data are sent to the rate at which the data links can transfer them, and to the rate at which the receiver can consume them;
- **robust:** it must be prepared to deal appropriately with every feasible action and with every possible sequence of actions under all possible conditions. The protocol

should make only minimal assumptions about its environment to avoid dependencies on particular features that could change;

- **consistent:** three consistency standards include: deadlock-free -- no states in which no further protocol execution is possible; livelock-free-- infinite looping without ever making effective progress; improper terminations -- the completion of a protocol execution without satisfying the proper termination condition.

Since RMP is a complicated protocol, the validation of the protocol design is important to increase confidence in its reliability and safety during operation. To verify that RMP specifications have all of the above characteristics is difficult and may even be impossible. The design of RMP includes many features that directly relate to the above requirements. Many of these features are borrowed from the experience in implementing TCP. For example, the recovery mode is designed to satisfy the requirement of self-stabilization. RMP time-out and retransmission mechanism applies self-adapting techniques. Since our concentration is on the RMP operation specifications, the main emphasis of our validation is on the completeness and consistency of RMP specifications, i.e. proving that the protocol is well-specified and consistent.

Before we get into the details of our formal analysis, it is necessary for us to clarify the meaning of verification and validation. The conventional meaning of these two words are best described by:

**Verification:** Are we building the product right?

**Validation:** Are we building the right product?

In other words, the verification is generally referred to the activities of certifying that a product meets its specifications, whereas the validation is referred to confirming that the product satisfies the original user requirement. But in the literature, these two words are

often used interchangeable. For example, for all model checkers we have used, most of them use verification to describe the formal analysis activities, but one tool uses validation exclusively for data communication protocols [HOLZ91]. Actually these tools are basically performing the same activities. Since in this report, we have used several different tools to perform our formal analysis, and different tools have different convention in using these two words, we do not make specific distinction for them. The overall goal of this report is to validate the formal specifications of RMP, i.e. to prove if the specifications possess the desired properties. To achieve this goal, we use some automated verification or validation tools. So in the context of specific tool, we will follow the convention of the tool to use verification or validation. In the end, we use the formal models to generate a test suite for implementation conformance testing. This testing is strictly a verification activity.

### **3.2 Validation Methods and Our Early Experience**

The current practice of protocol validation can be dividend into two types: mathematical proofs and model checkers. The mathematical proof approach involves specifying the protocol assumptions as axioms and proving the protocol properties as a sequence of lemmas and theorems. It may be a pure mathematical proof or the proof based on the use of some theorem provers. Another approach is based on the use of model checkers. In this case, protocol operations are specified in the model checker's formal specification languages and used as a input to the verification systems. Verifiers then perform an exhaustive search over all possible state spaces according to the specified protocol operations. The protocol properties are verified against all possible states and paths.

Currently there are several theorem provers and model checkers available for free. The advantages of the mathematical proof approaches include its rigorous, precise derivation of protocol properties, and independence of lower-level implementation. The main disadvantages of mathematical approaches includes the high-level abstraction that is



separated from the implementation. The lack of traceability between the theorems and implementation makes it very difficult to find direct correspondence between them. For the model checkers, it is more straight forward to translate the protocol operations into the system-specific specification language and the proven properties can be directly related the design specification and implementation.

In our first attempt to formally verify the RMP, we used the SMV model checker [BURC90]. Some initial attempts reveal some limits on this model checker, including the state explosion problem and the lack of high level data-structure support. We then decided to use the PVS [RUSH93]. There is a rigorous mathematical proof of the Token Ring Protocol [CHAN84], on which RMP is loosely based. We then switched our concentration on the theorem prover approach and tried to replicate the theorem proof by PVS. Because PVS is a mechanized system, most proof steps must be input by the interactive user. We didn't pursue along this approach too far, since it is not tractable to implementation. It is until we found other two model checkers, i.e. Murphi and SPIN, we made some solid progress in constructing the formal models of RMP. Through this early trial-and-error approach, we learned that it is very important to construct the formal models at an appropriate abstract level compatible to the underlying tool's specification language. In the following sections, we describe the properties of these tools and our experience with them. We feel that these experiences are very important for directing us to our current success. Finally we outline our verification strategy and the development process model based on these available tools.

### 3.3 Theorem Prover

The mathematical proof approach for formal protocol verification involves specifying the protocol assumptions as axioms and proving the protocol properties as a sequence of lemmas and theorems. It may be a pure mathematical proof such as the verification of the

Token Ring Protocol [YODA92] or the proof based on the use of some theorem provers [DREX92]. A typical and popular theorem prover system we have come across and used in our project is PVS -- Prototype Verification System from Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Stanford University. It is a prototype for a system specification and verification based on higher-order logic. It consists of a specification language integrated with support tools and a theorem prover. PVS tries to provide the mechanization needed to apply formal methods both rigorously and productively. The primary purpose of PVS is to provide formal support for conceptualizing and debugging in the early stages of the life-styles of the design of a hardware or software system, when the executable version of the system is still not available. PVS has the following features [RUSH93]:

- **Early Stage Verification:** It is intended to be useful for early life-style application of formal methods, instead of program verification of a program in some concrete programming language satisfied the specification. It is designed to help in detection of design errors as well as in the confirmation of “correctness”;
- **Rich Type System:** Compared with some similar systems, it has very rich type-system and correspondingly rigorous typechecking. A great deal of specification can be embedded in PVS types, and typechecking can generate proof obligations that amount to a very strong consistency check on some aspects of the specification. It combines a rich expressive specification language and an effective theorem prover;
- **Interactive Proof and Automation:** PVS provides a good combination of direct control by the user for the higher levels of proof development, and the powerful automation for the lower proofs. It proves the theorem through the process of challenging specifications. At the high level proof, user can easily input the prove commands, while most lower proofs can be carried out by the powerful theorem prover;
- **Good Conservative Extension:** It helps eliminate certain kinds of errors by pro-

viding very rich mechanism for conservative extension. PVS provides both the freedom of axiomatic specification, and the safety of a generous collection of definitional and constructive forms, so that users may choose the style of specification most appropriate to their problems.

PVS has been used to verify several systems, including fault-tolerating protocol, airline-reservation system, selected aspects of the control software for NASA's space shuttle project. It runs on workstation with mediate system resources requirement of disk space and memory space(30 MB hard disk + 20MB swapping space, > 12 MB memory). PVS is implemented in Common Lisp. All versions of PVS require Gnu Emacs as its user interface. Latex and appropriate viewer are needed to support certain optional feature of PVS, such as the pretty typing of the proof.

RMP is based on Chang's Token Ring Protocol and there is a mathematical proof on the protocol based on the use of the modal primitive recursive functions [YODA92]. Our first effort was to replicate the proof by using Paves *since*, *time* operators and *sequence* and *behavior* types [RUSH93]. These constructed types can be used directly to specify RMP properties. We made some progress in replicating the proof, yet we didn't pursue our verification of the protocol design using PVS. First, the learning curve of PVS is very steep and PVS proof are still mostly mechanic. Even the proof of some simple theorems can be quite involved and requires a lot user interactive input. Secondly, we feel that even if we can formally prove some theorems with the protocol, it is difficult to relate the theorems with the actual implementation. Since mathematical theorems proved by PVS are generally at the very high abstract level and there is still significant gap between the implementation and the theorems. As our primary goal was to integrate formal methods into the software development process and to increase the quality and reliability of the software, we chose to pursue our verification based on analysis by model checkers whose state-based analysis can

more easily be compare with tests executed on the implementation. A recent report shows a new implementation of theorem prover which has integrated the model checkers into the prover system to allow more powerful automatic proof through model checker [RAJA95]. This new system may help to relieve heavy user interaction and lead to shorter proofs.

### **3.4 Model Checkers**

Model checkers use a high-level formal specification as language input and generate code to perform an exhaustive search over all possible states in order to verify properties of the specified system. In an effort to facilitate the automatic verification of high-level design for hardware and software systems, several tools have been developed and used in many applications. We used three tools in the process of verifying RMP: SMV-Symbolic Model Verifier from Carnegie-Mellon University [BURC90]; MURPHI from Stanford University [MELT93] and SPIN from AT&T Bell Laboratories [HOLZ91, HOLZ94]. These tools have their own features and users can choose appropriate tool to perform different verification tasks at different levels. In the following subsections, we describe these three tools and our experience with them.

#### **3.4.1 SMV**

SMV is a tool for checking finite state systems, from completely synchronous to completely asynchronous, against the system specification expressed in the temporal logic CTL [BURC90]. It allows for specifications of non-determinism and concurrency in its model. SMV attempts to directly model system behavior by specifying state transitions explicitly for each state variable, expressed as procedures of variable assignments. SMV has been effectively used in some hardware design verification. It supports rich temporal logic specifications and an incremental, modular approach to protocol specification and verification.

We have constructed several simple formal RMP models using SMV. Since our first attempt involved too much protocol implementation details, we faced severe difficulties in extending the simple models to include the full protocol specifications. In addition, when the model is incrementally built, we quickly run into the problem of state explosion. There is simply not enough memory to perform exhaustive state space search and extending the running time does not help. One execution of a SMV model of RMP was aborted after about ten days.

### **3.4.2 Murphi**

The Murphi Verification System consists of the Murphi compiler and the Murphi description language. The Murphi Compiler generates a special purpose verifier in C++ from a Murphi description. After further compiling by C++ compiler, the special purpose verifier can be used to check the properties of the system, such as error assertion, invariant and deadlock. The Murphi description language is a high-level description language for finite-state asynchronous concurrent systems. It supports user-defined data types, procedures, and parameterization of descriptions. A complete Murphi description consists of declaration of constants, types, global variables, and procedures; a collection of transition rules; a description of the initial states; and a set of invariants.

In Murphi, a state is an assignment of values to all of the global variables of the description. The verifier starts execution in the specified start state. It then applies all executable rules to this state to generate new states. All visited states and unexplored new states are stored in two state queues. Whenever a next state is generated by applying a rule to an unexplored state, it is compared with all visited states to see if it is a new state. The execution stops if an error occurs or if all executable rules have been applied to all states and no new state can be generated.

Because Murphi choose the next executable rule arbitrarily from all applicable rules, the Murphi descriptions are non-deterministic. So the correct Murphi program must do the right thing no matter which rules are chosen. This execution model is good for describing asynchronous systems where different processes run at arbitrary speed which interact via shared variables. Message passing can be modelled by reading from and writing to a buffer variable or array.

The Murphi verification system can be run in two different modes: simulator mode or verifier mode. In the simulator mode, the simulator chooses among the rules arbitrarily to get the next state. It will run forever or until an error occurs. On the other hand, the verifier considers the results for ALL possible choice either by breadth-first search or depth-first search procedures. It stores all states in a large hash tables so that it can cut off the search whenever it encounters a state it has seen before. Explicit “assert” and “error” statements in the Murphi model description can be checked in each step. If one of these conditions occurs, the verifier halts and print a diagnostic consisting of a reconstructed sequence of states that leads from the initial state to the error state. All invariants expressions are checked along all explored paths. Initially, Murphi was designed for hardware design verification. It has been successfully used to verify some hardware design as well as some protocol design, including the design of large cache-coherence protocol (DASH) [LENO92].

Our first trial on Murphi has the same problem as we had on SMV. The reason is that we tried to construct a model which involves too much detailed on the protocol operations. When we tried to extend out simple model, we faced the same state explosion problem. Only after we decided to construct our model at a much higher level did we start to get some real progress in the Murphi model. Our later experience shows that Murphi is a good verification tool at this level, because it offers the following characteristics:

- **Asynchronous State-Machine:** Murphi is designed for the verification of asynchronous state-machine;
- **One-to-One Rule Translation:** Our protocol specifications can be easily transfer into Murphi rule specification, which help us to keep high fidelity between our models and the protocol specifications;
- **Invariant and Assertion:** Murphi verification system has rich supports for temporal logic invariant specification and insertions of assertion in the specification. It also support fairness properties specification along the exploration path.

These characteristics are very helpful to our protocol verification. Therefore, we have performed most of our verification analysis based on our Murphi models of RMP.

### 3.4.3 SPIN tool

SPIN is a tool for analyzing the logical consistency and general verification for proving correctness properties of distributed or concurrent systems, especially for data communication protocols. The system is described in a modeling language called PROMELA. The language allows for the dynamic creation of concurrent processes. Communication via message channels can be defined to be synchronous (i.e. rendez-vous), or asynchronous (i.e. buffered). The protocol system is described as a group of processes running at their own rate, exchanging message through communication channels. Each process can make state transition based on the state variable values and the channel event and produce output to other processes' communication channels.

Given a model system specified in PROMELA, SPIN can either perform random simulations of the systems's execution or it can generate a C program that performs a fast exhaustive validation of the system state space. During simulations and validations, SPIN checks for the absence of deadlocks, unspecified receptions, and inexecutable code. The

validator can also be used to verify the correctness of system invariants specified as never clauses, and it can find non-progress execution cycles.

Compared with the Murphi tool, SPIN has several additional advantages. First, SPIN is especially designed for verification of data communication protocols, and it currently has over 1000 active users in both academic and industrial world. Secondly, it has the explicit support for the communication channels between processes, which is good for instantiating the detailed communication mechanism between RMP processes. Thirdly, SPIN has adopted some advanced algorithms to address the state explosion problem. Users can use either state reduction algorithm or bit-state reduction to perform best possible search in the case of state explosion. After we successfully constructed an abstract formal model using Murphi, we switched to SPIN to include the detailed communication mechanisms among different processes and verify the protocol at lower level of details than the Murphi model.

### **3.5 Our Verification Strategy and Process Model**

From the above review, we can conclude that theorem provers usually work on a higher level of abstraction than the model checkers. From PVS, Murphi, to SPIN, they can simulate protocol operation details in a increased order. In our RMP development project, our main goal is to increase the quality and reliability of the RMP implementation. As there is already rigorous mathematical proof of the basic token ring algorithm, it is more appropriate for us to use model checkers to verify the completeness and consistency of the protocol specifications. At this point, it is very critical to choose appropriate level of abstraction to be simulated by the model checkers. Our early trials on these tools gave us valuable experience in choosing a suitable abstraction level. Our initial attempts on all of these tools involved too much operation details, perhaps influenced by the RMP implementation. Only after we determined to use a higher-level abstraction to specify and simulate the RMP operations, we started to make some real progress in constructing formal



models. While SMV does not support complex data structure, our first model involved some lower level simulation of the protocol operations, which make it hard to build a complete model. After that, we decided to use the Murphi tool to build a more abstract formal model of RMP. At this level, we do not concern about the details of the underlying data structures. Instead we used non-deterministic algorithms to allow for all possible transitions. In this way, we built our first Murphi model of RMP. Based on the success of the first model, we further construct more elaborated interaction model involving lower level data structures using SPIN's communication channels.


In summary, based on the above existing tools, the event-driven design of RMP protocol and the mode table specification of RMP, we will perform the verification and validation in the following two steps:

- **Single Site Murphi Model:** we use the Murphi tool to construct a single site model directly based on the RMP specifications. Each rule in this model will directly come from the specifications. In this relative high-level model, we are not concerned about how those events are generated and how this site's transition is going to affect other sites. We are mainly concerned about the completeness and consistency of the RMP specification of a single site's response to arbitrary events under all possible states. Essentially, we ignore the action part of the specification but only the transition part. We only examine a site's behavior under arbitrary sequence of events;
- **Multiple Site SPIN Model:** we use the SPIN tool to construct a multiple-site interaction model, which will actually model interaction and event generation in the RMP processes. The explicit communication channel feature in SPIN will be used to simulate the Data Queue, Event Queue and the Ordering Queue in RMP. Therefore this is a much low level model than in the Murphi model. The state

explosion problem arising from the complex interaction between RMP processes will be handled by the bit-state reduction algorithm.

Since RMP operates in two distinct modes, i.e. the normal operation mode and the recovery mode, it is appropriate for us to verify two modes separately. In this way, the essential features of RMP are preserved while the possible state explosion problem is avoided. This approach significantly reduces the state space as compared to the combined model, while still maintaining the fidelity. To increase the fidelity between the implementation and the specifications, these formal models developed are used to generate a test suite for implementation's conformance testing. So the correct verified protocol behaviors are tested on the implementation along all possible paths. Consequently the formal models are fully integrated into the development life-style.

In the entire process of the protocol verification and testing, we followed a iterative and interactive model of development (Fig. 2). From the first outline of RMP specification, we start building the formal models using different tools based on the formal specifications. These models are constructed in a incremental fashion, i.e. from the simplest normal operation model without data loss, to a fully operational model. Any changes in the design and specification will result in the modification of the formal models. Any errors detected in the formal models are fed back to the protocol designers and may result in changes in the specifications. At the same time, implementation activities can progress in parallel based on the specifications. Any changes in the specifications can be reflected in the implementation in the early stage. The formal models also provide a good testbed for alternative designs. After the formal models are fully refined and the implementation is finished, the formal models are used to generate test cases. These tests are executed the implementation to provide feedback to the specifications. Since the specifications, the formal models and the implementation interact constantly, a good traceability for software changes can be achieved. Consequently through these mutual interaction among the



**Figure 2. Our Software Development Process Model**


specifications, the formal models, and the implementation, the high fidelity between the specification and the implementation can be achieved and the reliability of the software increases. We feel that this development approach incorporates the formal models into the whole development process and improve the software process.

## Chapter 4 Formal Models of RMP

### 4.1 The Single-Site Murphi Model

As stated in the previous chapter, we first build a single-site model using the Murphi tool. This single site model simulates a single RMP site's behavior under an arbitrary sequence of events. To construct the model, we simplify and then extract the minimal state variables from the specifications. Secondly, state transition rules can be built using the transitions in the RMP specifications. Finally, we use Murphi tool to perform various verification and analysis on this formal model, such as deadlock analysis, state assertions and system invariants.

#### 4.1.1 Some Simplifications



**Figure 3. Murphi Model of RMP**

For the single site model, we do not consider the details of the underlying data structures of RMP and any interaction between RMP processes. We simply assume that there is a network event generator which generates all possible RMP events in an arbitrary sequence

(Fig. 3). The model simulates the behavior of a RMP site under this event sequence. This assumption greatly simplifies our model while still provides valuable information on the completeness and consistency of the transitions in the RMP specifications.

Let us see some of the consequence of this simplifications. First, because we ignore the interaction between RMP processes and all events are generated by a network event generator, we need not consider those actions specified in the RMP specifications. Those actions only affect other sites, such as the actions of multicast or unicast packets to other sites. Second, since there is no concept of data sequence number, timestamp, Data Queue or Ordering Queue, all necessary conditions in the specifications are simulated by numerated variables and governed by non-deterministic transitions and fairness rules. For example, the implementation of an Ordering Queue includes a sequence of slots ordered by timestamps. In this simplified model, we do not simulate this data structure directly. Instead, as the ordering queue can only be in CONSISTENT state or INCONSISTENT state, we simply use a scalar variable with two possible values to represent the state of Ordering Queue. Here a CONSISTENT state means that the site has all slots filled up in its Ordering Queue up to the last time stamp of the last ACK or NL packet. Since we do not have the concept of timestamp at this level of abstraction in the model, we can not include detailed fields within data packets and Ordering Queue. Rather, upon receipt of specified event, this site's state variable is set non-deterministically to either CONSISTENT state or INCONSISTENT state. In this way, the model is guaranteed to simulate all possible behaviors of the single site under arbitrary events. Third, the system response to certain events have the same effect on state variables, as we do not consider the underlying implementation details. For simplicity, we will simply ignore those events and replace them with the similar events that have the same effect on the state variables. For example, the model will react in the same manner to member data packets and non-member data packets. The model keeps the data event and ignore the non-member data event.

#### 4.1.2 Minimal State Variables

To represent an RMP state, we have to decide which minimal set of variables can sufficiently and accurately represent a site's state behavior. Because we do not explicitly simulate the Data Queue and Ordering Queue, we use some numerated variables to simulate all state variables. We also have to keep the state variables at minimum to avoid possible state explosion problem. Upon examining the RMP specifications, we found that the following variables are necessary to honestly represent the specifications:

- a. **STATE**: a variable that represents the operation mode of the RMP site, which could only be {NTS (Not Token Site), TS (Token Site), PT (Passing Tokensite), GP (Getting Packets), NIR (Not In Ring), JK (Joining Ring), LR (Leaving Ring), SR (Start Recovery), CNL (Create New List), SV (Sent Vote), ANL (Acked New List), AR (Abort Recovery)};
- b. **OQ**: a scalar variable to represent the state of the site's Ordering Queue, which can only be {CSI (Consistent), INCSI (Inconsistent)};
- c. **TKSTATE**: a variable to indicate the token-pass status of a single site. For a named next token site or the current token site, the site will perform different transitions based on the token-pass status, i.e., if the token is successfully passed, it will transit to PT, or else stay in the TS. This variable can only assume two possible values: {TKP (ToKen Passed), TKUP (ToKen UnPassed)};
- d. **EXIT** and **TIME**: these two variables are used for membership change operations only. EXIT variable is used to check if the required exit condition is satisfied before the site can actually leave the token ring. The EXIT variable can only assume the values of {YES, NO}. The TIME variable is used to represent the relative value of timestamps of different packets, which can only be {GT (Greater Than), LE (Less or Equal)}.

Besides these state variables, we also need a way to get additional information from the data packets. For example, if a site receives an ACK packet, it will react differently based on whether the site is named as the next token site or not. Because we do not simulate the fields within data packets, we need to include this additional information in our model. For the normal operation model, we define a structure with two fields in every data packets: one field called `PACKET_TYPE` to hold the information about the type of the packet; another field called `PACKET_STATE` to hold additional information on packets, such as whether named this site as the next token site or not. The first field can be any of 13 RMP event types, and the second field can be {NTS (Named TokenSite), NNTS (Not Named TokenSite)}.

#### 4.1.3 State Transition Rules and Actions

Even though this single site model is a high-level abstract model, we want to keep high-fidelity with the specifications as close as possible. Based on the above simplifications, we achieve this high-fidelity by directly translating each specified transition in the specifications into a Murphi rule in the model. Each transition in the specifications is translated into a Murphi transition. In the RMP specifications, however, if the response to an event is not specified, by default, it is supposed to be ignored by the site. In Murphi, we have to explicitly specify this ignorance rule. Otherwise, a deadlock state may occur (see next section).

For the specified actions associated with each transition, we first cross out those actions that only affect other sites, such as multicast or unicast of certain packets. And then we examine those actions which will actually change a site's state variables. These actions include: (a) updating Ordering Queue; (b) passing the token. We create two procedures and use the non-deterministic algorithm to simulate the possible change of the state variables:

- (a) `UpdateOrderingQueue` -- whenever a site receives an ACK or NL packet, it puts

the packet in the Ordering Queue and update Ordering Queue. This action may non-deterministically change the value of OQ variable;

(b) PassToken -- whenever a site is in token site (TS) or named as the next token site, upon receiving a data packet, it will try to pass the token by calling the procedure PassToken, which may change the value of state variable TKSTATE. Depending on whether the token is successfully passed, the site will take different transitions.

As stated in the RMP specifications, all actions specified are taken *before* the transition. To make our model follow this specification, we associate above actions with the event generator. All actions are taken immediately after the corresponding event is generated. Then transition rule based on the current state variables are taken. In this way, our model works in the exact same way as specified. Besides the state transition rules, we also need rules for event generation. Our first model was restricted to certain sequence of events. Later analysis shows that this restriction unnecessarily complicates the event generator and may result in deadlock. Consequently, we remove this constraint and generate all events in random order.

#### **4.1.4 Deadlock Avoidance**

Following the above simplifications and abstraction, it is now straightforward to translate the RMP specifications into the corresponding Murphi model. But when we first run the code generated by the Murphi compiler, it always ran into the deadlock state -- a state where the system does not know what to do next except staying in the same state. Further analysis shows that this does not mean that there is a deadlock state in the specifications. Rather, most of time we found that the model does not honestly represent the specified behavior. The analysis on these deadlock states involves a lot of adjustment and fine-tuning of the model. It is also the first step that we get some feedbacks from the model and start



the iterative interaction with the protocol designers and implementators. We took the following approaches to remove pessimistic deadlock states or perform some analysis on the potential problems in the design:

(a) **Event Sequence:** Initially, the network event generator produces events according to some specified sequence. The idea behind that is to simulate the most likely sequences of events first. As a result of this specified event sequence, the system may easily lead into a state where the next possible events are not defined, thus in a deadlock state. Later the model is modified to allow arbitrary sequences of events to be generated, i.e. the event after an ACK event could be any event. While it is good to simulate the most likely sequence of events first and check a site's response under the normal sequence of events, we feel that it is the value and the advantage of the formal methods to verify that the specified system has deadlock-free state under arbitrary event sequence. By including all possible sequences of all events, we are able to show the completeness of the specifications;

(b) **Alternative Operation Between Two Modes:** Originally, the model operates in a completely non-deterministic way. The model simply picks any executable rules and transits into next new state. In this way, the system may generate several events without allowing any site response. This is one possible way to simulate the packet loss over the network, but it also easily leads into a deadlock state. Since at this abstract level, there is no explicit way to simulate the NACK mechanism in case of data packet loss and we do simulate the event queue (No event buffering), all data loss are simulated by getting the corresponding data packets later by the site and bringing the site into CONSISTENT Ordering Queue state. Therefore we modify the model to operate alternatively in two modes: event generation mode and site response mode. In event generation mode, a new event is randomly generated. Since all actions specified are taken before actually transiting to next state, the corresponding actions are also taken as the next event is generated. In the

site response mode, the RMP site responds to the event based on the current values of the state variables. In this way, the model works alternatively in the event generation mode and the site response mode;

(c) **Event Ignorance Rules:** In the RMP specification, all events not specified are supposed to be ignored by the site. But in the Murphi model, the site response to ALL events must be explicitly specified, even for those events which are supposed to be silently ignored. The corresponding “ignore” rule must also be explicitly added into the model to avoid unknown response deadlock;

(d) **Fairness Properties:** After all above precautions have been taken, the system may still get into deadlock state. The key of this problem lies in the fairness properties in the model. In the actual operation of the protocol, the site will stay most of its time in the normal operation mode, where the packet loss seldom happens and all lost packets will soon be retransmitted by the NACK mechanism. But in the verification system, the system performs an exhaustive search. If there is any possible path which will lead to deadlock or inconsistent state, it will find it and stay there forever. For example, if a site loses a data packet and gets into INCONSISTENT state by an ACK event, the lost packet is supposed to be retransmitted by NACK mechanism. Without further specification, the site may stay in the inconsistent state forever, eventually violating the system invariant and blocking the token rotation. The way out is to use the fairness specification to further specify that certain events should happen infinitely often. For example, the lost data packets will eventually be retransmitted and bringing the site back to CONSISTENT state again. Otherwise the site would have to fail and nor further operation is possible. The fairness specifications play a important role in this single site model, since we do not have a way to explicitly simulate the NACK mechanism and timestamp.

During the evolutionary processing of formal methods, we gradually refined our model to

a state that honestly represents the specified protocol behaviors and runs deadlock-free. We feel that it is this part of model tuning process that helps us verify our protocol. Typically, during the initial debugging and adjustment phase, the Murphi model is run under the simulation mode so that any deadlock can be easily caught by the simulator and corresponding change can be made easily. For instance, if the model runs into a deadlock state and the analysis shows that the system is in a state where the event response is not specified. By default, the event is supposed to be ignored by the site. At this point, the question goes back to the designers to see if the site is indeed supposed to ignore the event. In some cases, the specifications must be modified to achieve the desired behavior. Sometimes, some adjustments are required to make the model correctly simulate the specified behavior. Through this iterative feedback from the formal models, we promote a common understanding of the protocol and increase our confidence on the design and specifications of RMP.

#### **4.1.5 Verification Analysis and State Invariants**

The Murphi verification system can check other properties beside the deadlocks. To make sure that the system has certain properties in certain states, we can add explicit “assert” and “error” statements within a rule. If an error condition occurs, the verifier halts and prints a diagnostic consisting of a reconstructed sequence of states that leads from the initial state to the error state. A more general way is to add system invariants into the model so that these invariants are checked against all explored paths. If the verifier finds that one of the invariants is false, it will print the detailed path from the initial state to the violating state. These invariants can be specified in a temporal logic statements. Generally, system invariants are the best way to verify protocol properties. But the difficulty is that most of time these invariants are far from trivial. To correctly specify a protocol invariant requires a thorough understanding of the protocol. Here we give two examples of RMP invariants. The first invariant is called “TS always CSI” -- if a site is a token site, then its Ordering

Queue must be always CONSISTENT. By the definition of the token site, this property must be true. If a site's Ordering Queue is INCONSISTENT, it should not become a token site. Rather, it should first get into GP state and wait until the Ordering Queue becomes CONSISTENT to transit into TS. After a site becomes token site, there should be no events with higher timestamp which will put the site into INCONSISTENT state, because the only packet which has timestamp greater than the last timestamp is supposed to be generated by the current token site. Another invariant is called "GP & INCSI always TKUP" -- if a site is in getting packet state and its Ordering Queue is INCONSISTENT, it must not have passed its token. Only when its Ordering Queue is CONSISTENT, it is possible for the site to pass token to the next site. These two invariants along with other invariants have been specified in the model and are verified to be true in our model.

After continuous manipulation of the model's fairness properties, we found that the minimum fairness properties required to guarantee all system invariants to be true are: (a) the token will eventually be passed by a named token site and; (b) a inconsistent Ordering Queue will eventually become consistent through the NACK mechanism (not simulated by the single site model). Under these fairness conditions, all system invariants hold. At this moment, we feel satisfied with the model, since these fairness conditions are just the minimum conditions in the common sense for the protocol to operate continuously without getting into recovery state. Of course, more detailed and elaborate invariants will lead to more detailed check on the system properties. It is worthwhile to mention that besides the use for exhaustive search, the model can also be used to examine the system behavior under a specific sequence of events to test an alternative design. We will talk about this later in the conformance testing part.

The above discussion is restricted to the normal operation model. The recovery model can be consorted in a similar way. For state variables, we need another variable ALL to

represent vote and ack information for Recoverability or AckNewList. Besides, we also need more fields to represent information in a data packet:

- **INFO**-- if the packet information matches with the site's information;
- **LIST**-- if the new list is valid or invalid (according to the pre-specified fault-resilient criteria);
- **RFM** -- if the list is the reformation list or not.

Most of these variable are binary variables. In this way, a recovery model is constructed and used to perform verification analysis. When fairness conditions are minimized, we found that for most recovery states there is only *one* way to recover successful. This strict requirement is compensated by the RMP's flexible design to allow for the creation of a single site's own group.

#### 4.1.6 Example Problems Found

Based on the above validation analysis, we have been able to identify some potential problem in the RMP specifications. These problems are reported to the protocol designers and result in revised and expanded specifications of RMP. Here we list some of problems identified by the formal models:

##### 1. Implicit Passing of Token

In the original token ring protocol, the token is explicitly passed by a transition from TS state to PT state. In the initial RMP design phase, the token was also considered as passed explicitly through the token site state. To keep the token rotating among the token ring members, each site must be in the token site state infinitely often. In our formal models, we found this invariant is false under the current specifications of RMP. Further analysis shows that in the current specifications of RMP, the token can be passed implicitly, i.e. the token can be passed by a site in NTS or GP state implicitly without explicitly transiting into

TS state. To check the token passing, we have to examine the change of the variable TKSTATE or the transitions from other states to the PT state. This finding provides us a better understanding of the current RMP specifications and change our ways to specify the invariant for token passing.

## **2. The Perpetual Getting Problem**

In the normal operation mode, if there is no data loss, the Ordering Queues of all member sites should be in the consistent state. Under this ideal condition, no site would get into GP (Getting Packet) state. Only if a site is named as the next token site and its Ordering Queue is not consistent, the site will transition into GP state. In our formal model, this non-ideal situation is inherently built-in and data loss is simulated by the non-deterministic transition of Ordering Queue state. We found that if the lost data packet can not be retransmitted by the network through NACK mechanism, the site would be blocked in GP state and the token would stop rotating, thus violating the reliable delivery requirement and resulting in a reformation. Formal models shows that this is a potential problem and that this problem can only be solved by guaranteeing that the lost data packet will be eventually retransmitted by the NACK mechanism. This finding leads us to test the implementation under this condition. The testing shows that the implementation does have correct behavior as specified in this situation. A site in GP state will not get out of GP, even though the lost data packet are retransmitted. Since the implementation does not check the status of the Ordering Queue while transiting into next state.

## **3. The Completeness of Recovery Specification**

The fault recovery of RMP specifications is of critical importance, since whenever there is an error or failure, the protocol switches into the recovery mode and tries to provide reliable service in face of faults. Fault tolerant applications are, by their nature, very difficult to develop and specify. Therefore, RMPs fault recovery process has undergone a very serious

examination. The formal recovery model indicates several problems. First, the specifications for recovery operations involve a lot of different conditions on the data packets fields, and relations between these conditions are not obvious. Consequently, the first recovery model always run into deadlock state as the specifications does not exhaust all possible combinations of these conditions. This problem is fedback to the protocol designers and results in a more expanded and complete specifications of recovery operations. For example, one condition is if the information contained in the packet matches the information stored in the current site. This is very general statement and several fields in the packet may break this condition. The other conditions include reformation list /not, valid/invalid new list. First, we notice that the information in a packet must be correct, then we can examine if it is a reformation list or valid list. Second, since there are several ways to break these conditions, the testing on these transitions should consider all possible combinations of packets. These observations help to identify several implementation problems in the testing and produce a expanded and complete specifications of recovery operations.

#### **4. Minimal Fairness Conditions**

After the formal models are refined into a deadlock state, we examine the system invariants to verify if the model possess the desired properties. Under the arbitrary sequences of events, most invariants do not hold without proper fairness conditions. Our goal is to identify the minimal fairness conditions for those invariants to hold and then examine these minimal conditions. For normal operation model, the minimal conditions are the lost data packets are eventually retransmitted and the token is eventually passed. We feel that this is a reasonable conditions for the normal operation model. But for the recovery model, we observed that for each recovery state, there is only one way to lead to successful reformation. To guarantee, a successful reformation eventually occurs, all of conditions in each state which lead to successful recovery must be true infinitely often. This is a strong

condition. But since a recovery involves a synchronization and coordination among all active members, we do not see any other ways to relieve these conditions. This finding suggest us to take a careful testing for the recovery mode in WAN environment to check if these conditions can be reasonably satisfied in a real network environment.

## **4.2 Multiple-Site SPIN Model**

### **4.2.1 The Need for Multiple-Site Model**

In the Murphi formal models, we examine the protocol behavior of a single site under arbitrary sequence of events. At this level of protocol abstraction, there is no concept of packet sequence number, timestamp, Data Queue, Ordering Queue or NACK mechanism. There is no explicit interaction between different members of the RMP processes and all event-generating action parts are ignored. All events are generated by a network driver in a non-deterministic manner, not by the ring member as part of the site's response action. In the models, all actions that only affect other sites states are ignored. The Murphi model is good for checking the completeness and consistency of the RMP specification related to the state transitions. The verification analysis on this level of abstraction shows that the protocol does preserve the required properties under the arbitrary sequence of events, assuming that certain fairness properties are satisfied. A complete verification of the protocol specifications requires us to consider interactions among different sites and all events should be generated as part of member's specified response action instead of being generated by the external random event generator.

Based on the above observations, we decided to take the advantage of SPIN tool's explicit support of communication channels [HOLZ91]. We develop a SPIN formal model of RMP which incorporates the interactions between token ring members and elaborate the communication mechanisms between different sites. As we need to simulate the action



parts of sending out data packets, ACK and NACK packets, we have to include the concept of sequence number, timestamp, Data Queue and Ordering Queue. Therefore, the SPIN model must have lower level simulation of the protocol operations and include some basic underlying data structures. For example, in the Murphi models, we simply use a non-deterministic algorithm to simulate the transition of a site's Ordering Queue between CONSISTENT and INCONSISTENT state. In the SPIN models, whether a site's Ordering Queue is consistent or not will be determined completely by examining the slots of the data structure in the site's Ordering Queue. Since we have to maintain some data structures to represent a site's state, this detailed model permits a closer comparison between the formal models and the implementation.

#### 4.2.2 Some Simplifications

Since RMP is a complicated protocol, it is neither necessary nor possible to use the SPIN tool to simulate all detailed behaviors in the protocol implementation. We have to make some simplifications for our model to abstract the main features of the protocol without getting into too overwhelm in details. In our model, we explicitly make the following simplifications:

- **Fixed single data source:** In the RMP specification, data packets can be sent to the token ring by any ring members or by other non-member sources. Allowing multiple data source will not introduce any operational complexity but simply make the book-keeping task more complex and difficult;
- **One ACK per data packet:** For efficiency reason, the current RMP specification and implementation support one ACK for multiple data packets, which is an extension of Chang's original token ring protocol [CHAN81]. But this expansion is strictly for the efficiency reasons and does not involve any fundamental change to the protocol operations. So in our model, we will keep the original one ack per data packet policy. Since our data source continuously send out data packets, there will

not be any NULL ACK packets in the normal operation model;

- **Small periodic sequence number/timestamp:** In the RMP specification, the data sequence number is source specific and could be any number determined by the source. These sequence numbers are used to determine the relative order for the data packets sent out by the same source. The timestamp is used to order all data packets from different sources and forms the base of virtual synchrony. The timestamp is monotonically increased by each ACK or NL packets until  $(2^{32} - 1)$ . It is then round back to zero and increases again. If we allow the timestamp to change in a large range, the mutual interaction between different sites will cause a state explosion. Since we have to keep our data structures simple and the number of state variables small, it is essential to have a good algorithm to represent the timestamp and the sequence number. From the above simplifications, we can use the same number for the data sequence number and the timestamp, since there is only one data source and no NULL ACK packet. The critical step is that we use a small periodic sequence/timestamp that ranges from 0 to  $(2*N-1)$  to simulate the finite states in the Ordering Queue. Here we have to used the following fact to update and periodically clear each site's Ordering Queue: whenever the token is rotated back to a site, the site can discard all data packets prior to the last timestamp sent out by this site and clear those slots for later use;

- **Three site interaction model:** More members in the ring will increase complexity of the protocol operations, but three members will represent almost all possible combinations of events and states possible in the interaction. To keep our model simple, we retain to three site interaction model. Actually, there is no intrinsic difficulty in instantiating more RMP processes in SPIN, since processes can be created dynamically. But more processes will require longer Ordering Queue and more complex book-keeping;

- **Strict flow control:** In the protocol design, flow control is a very complicated

and important issue, especially when NACK policy is implemented. A good flow control algorithm should allow for the fastest data transmission without unnecessary duplicate data retransmission. To avoid unnecessary complication in our formal model, we use a strict flow control mechanism that the data source will not send the next data packet until it receives the acknowledgment for the last sent packet. To construct a formal model with the realistic time-out/retransmission algorithm involves much more nontrivial work.

Based on the above simplification, the formal RMP SPIN models are built in an incremental fashion. First, a model with no data packet loss is constructed, where the data source initially sends out a data packet and each site reacts as specified in the protocol specification. This model mainly consist two basic processes: a multicaster process that plays the role of network multicasting network and a RMP process that generate events and responds to the events on its own event queue. The data source will not send the next packet until it receives the acknowledgment for the last packet. All multicast packets (DATA, ACK) are multicast to all members through a multicaster process. Unicast packet are sent directly to the destination data queues. We use arrays of size  $(2*N)$  to record the data packets and ordering queue slots. Different from the RMP implementation, all data packets will stay in the data queue and will never be actually placed in the ordering queue, since we have the same sequence/timestamp. Each process loops infinitely on its event queue: get next event from the event queue, take actions and transit as specified in the specifications. Whenever there is a system-wide time-out, it is assumed that the last packets are lost by all members and will be retransmitted. After this first model is constructed, a more detailed model with data lose and NACK and retransmission mechanism is constructed.

### 4.2.3 Results

Even from the simplest version of SPIN model of RMP, we can learn something beyond

our first intuition. Since all packets in the first model are transmitted reliably, we naively assumed that each site would always have their Ordering Queue in the CONSISTENT state and will never get into INCONSISTENT state. Consequently, all sites would never get into GP state -- a state that was named as the next token site, but its Ordering Queue was in inconsistent state such that it can not accept the token immediately. But the first run of the model shows that even in this reliable delivery case, it is still possible to get into GP state temporarily. Due to the response speed differences among different sites, the data packets may be delivered out of order. In the case where the ACK packet is delivered ahead of the corresponding data packet, the site may be temporarily in the GP state. This is the advantage of the automatic verification tool: even for a simple model, it can exhibit you some non-trivial behaviors.

The next level of the model involves the simulation of network behavior. Since RMP is built on top of UDP, packets may be lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order. For the current RMP specifications, the duplicated packets should not cause any specific problems. The mis-ordered delivery of data packets is simulated automatically by the SPIN system by considering all possible different rates among different processes. So the main task is how to simulate data loss and the retransmission mechanism. Due to the data loss, the model may easily get into deadlock state without careful consideration. If the packet is missed by all members in the ring, the data source will be waiting for acknowledgment for the data packet while the current token site, which is responsible for generating the acknowledgment packet for the lost data packet, is waiting for the data packet to arrive. In the implementation, this problem is solved by setting a alarm for the token site to pass the token within certain time limit. If no data packet arrives in this limit, the token site will pass the token by a NULL ACK packet. In our case, we use the global time-out feature in SPIN to retransmit the lost packet: whenever there is a system-wide time-out and the system is in a deadlock state, the last (lost) packet is re-multicast to all members in the ring.

As in the Murphi model, we first run the model in a simulation mode. The simulation runs can be useful in quickly debugging new designs, but the simulation does not prove that the system is error free. In the simulation mode, if there is any error checked by the assert statement or system deadlock, one can easily debug the code. All visited states are not stored, but interpret and execute statements on the fly. Generally, we use this mode under two cases. In the first case, if the SPIN model is newly constructed, the simulation helps us quickly debug the model. In the second case, the model is too complicated to take an exhaustive search on all possible states, a long time simulation may help to gain coverage in trade of time.

After the formal model is established in a bug-free state, a verification code is generated to perform an exhaustive validation. The first type of validation the SPIN model can perform is the reachability analysis. This includes checking the state properties and system invariants, such as the assertion violation, and detecting the error assertions. All of these tasks can be easily done by examining all possible states. The second type of analysis is the detection of deadlock. To distinguish the normal termination from the deadlock, the acceptable end states are marked by end labels. The third type of analysis is bad cycles detection, including non-progress cycles and livelocks. Some systems may not have deadlock state, but they may loop infinitely without making “real progress”. Here “real progress” means passing some states with desired properties. You can place progress labels in the SPIN model to indicate some desired progress states. For example, in the RMP normal operation, we want the token to be rotated around all members and all sites will be in token site state (TS) infinitely often. We can mark the statement with its state in TS as the progress state. If the token can be implicitly passed without explicitly transiting into TS state, the situation will be more complicated. Similarly, to formalize the opposite of the non-progress cycles that something bad can not happen infinitely often, one uses the accept labels. The last type of validation analysis is through temporal logic claims. In PROMELA,

all temporal claims are expressed as never clauses, e.g. in a way that something as specified should never happen in the protocol. It is relatively hard to express some complicated temporal claims in never clauses, but the new release of SPIN has an additional option to translate the linear temporal logic specifications into never clauses.

If an error is found, you can run the verifier again with `-t` flag to follow the full error trail. SPIN has several command options to change the default settings of the state space search, including maximum search depth, and hash table entries. An important feature of SPIN is that it provides feasible analysis in case of state explosion. A order analysis shows that most computers with 16-32 MB memory will run out of space for a system about  $10^5$  states [HOLZ91]. For models with multiple process interaction, this limit can easily be reached. In this case, an exhaustive search is impossible. Besides random simulation, SPIN offers a bit-state supertrace algorithm to perform best possible partial-search. Some analysis shows that this algorithm is by far the best in the case of impossible exhaustive search.

Up to now, most of our analysis are on the deadlock and state assertion. For the interaction model, because the events are generated as part of a site's action, it is far from trivial to get the model into a deadlock-free state. Because of the interaction, the current version of normal operation model has already exceeded the limit of our machine memory. Therefore it is not possible to perform exhaustive search, and the verification of temporal logic specification becomes incomplete. But since we already have reasonable confidence over the transitions rules in the RMP specifications by the Murphi models, the SPIN model can mainly serve to check the completeness and consistency of action part.

#### **4.2.4 Future Directions**

We have successful constructed a SPIN model for normal RMP operations and carried out various validation analysis on the model. We did not find any major problems, but the

model does help us to appreciate the complication of the protocol. For the RMP recovery operation, we still face some difficulty in efficiently simulated various alarms and time-out mechanisms. In RMP, alarms play an important role in retransmission. We have to find a way to simulate these alarms and retransmission algorithms effectively before we can further improve our models. We believe that SPIN has enough power to perform a good validation analysis on RMP.

## Chapter 5 Test Generation

### 5.1 Conformance Testing and Testing Strategy

The development of RMP follows our iterative model: a full interaction between development team and the verification team. Upon the first design finished, the development team moved forward to implement the protocol design in C++ and the verification team starts working on the formal models based on the specifications. Any potential problems found in the verification process are feedback to the design and development team and may result in the modification of the specifications and the implementation. Upon the completion of the first RMP implementation, the conformance testing of the implementation becomes the main task for the verification team. A white-box testing would be good if there is enough resources and time. Considering the large size of our implementation (> 2,2000 lines of code) and the group size of our team (2 for design and implementation, 2 for testing and verification), we resort to the code review and black-box testing. Code review is good to find some apparent and developer's habitual coding errors, and black-box testing will serve the conformance testing. Since black-box testing is based on the testing of all required functions, it is also known as functional testing.

Since the high fidelity between the specifications, the formal models, and the implementation is our goal, we will perform the minimal functional-testing for the implementation as our first step. All operational transitions specified in the specifications are under testing to make sure that the implementation has the desired behavior. Since RMP



is a distributed communication protocol, we have to find a way to do testing for this kind of distributed system. Fortunately, the implementators of RMP has designed and coded the implementation of RMP with testability in mind and has built in a lot of conditional compiling codes to facilitate the testing. These include some operation like dumping the contents of Ordering Queue and Data Queue, assertions about the current state variables. Actually, based on these additional code, a small testscript language is created to facilitate the testscript generation. The conformance testing of RMP is based on this testscript framework [MORR95].

## 5.2 Test generation

Since we adopt a functional testing strategy, the test suite generated has to cover all specified transitions in the specifications. Our formal models perform verification by examining all states and along all possible paths. That means, all possible combinations of the transition paths and the all states are already explored by the verification system. We may simply use the explored states and paths as our testing suite. Along this line, all required test cases for the functional testing are already explored by the formal models, the problem is how to extract this information out from the formal models and the verification system.

Under our testscript framework, tests are executed in a single RMP process. Instead of using explicit network communication, the testscript framework allows us to input any data packets and insert some failure conditions. This approach is very similar to the single site Murphi model: we are examining a single site's behavior against the specifications under all possible events. Therefore a test suite is generated based on the Murphi models.

Our first intent was to modify the Murphi system to output our test suite directly with certain option flags. We examined the class hierarchy in the Murphi source code and

intended to add some command flags to generate test suite. The Murphi system consists of a complex class hierarchy and the work can not be done through the modification of a single class. At the same time, we observed that the Murphi system supports a verbose output option, by which the system produces verbose every step as it progresses. Hence we decided that instead of changing the Murphi system directly, we would run the verifier in verbose mode and direct the output into a file. We build a tool to extract the test suite out from this file. To extract the explored paths from the Murphi verifier's output, we use a text extraction language called Perl. Perl is a powerful language for text extraction and report writing. We reconstruct all explored paths and produce a test suite in our desired format. This is a more efficient way to produce test suite.

We wrote a program to extract the test cases from the Murphi output. First, two arrays are constructed to establish the correspondence between the Murphi state number and the values of state variables. As Murphi performs the search on all possible states, it increasingly assigns an unique integer to any new state. Secondly, the entire searching tree is reconstructed based on the verbose output of Murphi verification system. This produces a nonuniform tree: some states may have only one direct child, while others states may have several children. The entire tree structure is stored in an array of lists. Each array element contains a list of states which are direct descendents of the current state. Finally, all explored paths are outputted as test cases by left-most search on the state tree. As tests are generated, the visited paths are removed from the state tree. This process continues until the state tree becomes empty. For the test output, we follow the SCR requirement table format and specify the test paths as the current state, the event, the conditions on state variables and the next state. This provides a direct input to Jeff's automatic test scripts generator tool [MORR95].

For the normal operation model, we start from the Not\_In\_Ring or Not-Token\_Site state

and examines all possible transitions according to the specifications. 291 different paths are generated for normal operations only. In Appendix II, we list the test suite generated this tool for the normal operation model without member change extension. It has total of 63 paths. Similar method is applied to recovery model and 250 test cases are generated.

### 5.3 Discussion

Up to now, a complete transition cover testing has been performed on the RMP implementation. But this test suite does not consider the difference between different state variable conditions. A complete functional testing should consider the state mode along with the different values of other state variables. Therefore, the transition cover testing has fewer test cases than the test cases generated by the Murphi. In our formal models, we separate the normal operation model from the recovery operation model. If we merge them together, the entire test set will significantly increase, since the test cases grow multiplicatively, instead of additively. The current testing on transition mainly concerns about the new state by verifying an assertion on the state mode, no other variables are being verified. Because testing is performed on a single RMP process, all actions to other sites are left untested. To include the testing on other variables as well as actions, more test cases need to be executed and the testscript framework need to be modified to support more assertions.

Besides providing the full functional coverage test cases, the formal model can also be used to explore the implementation behavior of RMP by generating the test paths under particular sequences of events. For example, if the behavior of the system under a certain sequences of events is suspected, we can generate the testing paths using the formal models to guide the testing of the implementation under this special sequence.

## Chapter 6 Conclusion

Based on the formal specifications of RMP, we have constructed formal models of RMP at two different levels and perform validation analysis on the protocol. The automatic verification systems provide the completeness and consistency check on the protocol specifications. This analysis helps us to identify some minor specification problems and provide guidance for conformance testing. Through formal analysis, we promote our understanding of the protocol and increase confidence on the protocol design. During the verification process, we followed an interactive and iterative development approach which helps enhance software tractability and maintain the fidelity between the specifications, formal models and the implementation. The formal analysis results are directly related to the implementation through our test suite generation tool.

During the process of formal analysis of RMP, we learned that the critical step for this approach is to construct the formal models at an appropriate level of abstraction. The abstraction level should be suitable for the formal specification support of the underlying verification systems. At the same time, the coordination and corporation between the implementation team and verification team is another important factor to this approach. In a large software development environment, this factor will become even severe. At this point, we can not say that we have formally verified RMP. By incorporating the formal methods into our development cycles, we have increased our confidence on the design and the quality of the implementation. We believe that more detailed works can be done and closer comparison with implementation can be achieved.

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## Appendix

### I. Part of RMP Specifications

Events in the RMP specification are one of several things. (1) Arriving packets, (2) Expired alarms, (3) User events, (4) Exceptional conditions. The specification event types are:

| Event Type | Description                       |
|------------|-----------------------------------|
| Data       | Data Packet                       |
| ACK        | ACK Packet                        |
| NACK       | ACK Packet                        |
| Conf       | Confirm Packet                    |
| NMD        | Non-Member Data Packet            |
| NMA        | Non-Member ACK Packet             |
| NL         | New List Packet                   |
| LCR        | List Change Request Packet        |
| RecStart   | Recovery Start Packet             |
| RecVote    | Recovery Vote Packet              |
| RecACKNL   | Recovery ACK New List Packet      |
| RecAbort   | Recovery Abort Packet             |
| Failure    | Retransmission timeout on packet  |
| TPA        | Token Pass Alarm                  |
| CTPA       | Confirm Token Pass Alarm          |
| RTA        | Random Timeout Alarm              |
| MandLv     | Mandatory Leave Alarm             |
| CommitNL   | Commit New List Notification      |
| JoinReq    | Application request to join group |

#### States:

|       |                        |
|-------|------------------------|
| TS    | Token Site State       |
| NTS   | Not Token Site State   |
| GP    | Getting Packets State  |
| PT    | Passing Token State    |
| JR    | Joining Ring State     |
| LR    | Leaving Ring State     |
| NIR   | Not In Ring State      |
| SR    | Start Recovery State   |
| CNL   | Created New List State |
| SV    | Sent Vote State        |
| ACKNL | ACK New List State     |
| AR    | Abort Recovery State   |

**Token Site State Table:**

| Event               | Condition(s)     | State    | Action(s)   |
|---------------------|------------------|----------|---|
| Data                | Token Passed     | PT       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| Data                | !Token Passed    | TS       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| NMD                 | Token Passed     | PT       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| NMD                 | !Token Passed    | TS       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| LCR                 | Token Passed     | PT       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| LCR                 | Token Passed     | TS       | place packet in DataQ<br>Pass-Token                     |
| ACK                 | Named Token      | TS       | Unicast Confirm to<br>Site Source                       |
| NL                  | Named Token      | TS       | Unicast Confirm to<br>Site Source                       |
| Failure<br>RecStart | (none)<br>(none) | SR<br>SV | Multicast RecStart<br>Unicast RecVote to<br>Reform Site |
| TPA                 | (none)           | PT       | Generate Null ACK<br>Multicast Null ACK                 |
| CTPA                | (none)           | TS       | Unicast Confirm to<br>last Token Site                   |

**Passing Token State Table:**

| Event | Condition(s)                             | State | Action(s)   |
|-------|--|-------|---|
| Data  | (none)                                   | PT    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ             |
| NMD   | (none)                                   | PT    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ             |
| LCR   | (none)                                   | PT    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ             |
| NL    | !named Token Site                        | NTS   | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| NL    | named Token Site<br>OrderingQ consistent | PT    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token |
| NL    | named Token Site<br>OrderingQ consistent | TS    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |

---



|          |  |     |  |
|----------|--|-----|--|
| NL       | !Token passed<br>named Token Site          | GP  | Pass-Token<br>Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ  |
| ACK      | !OrderingQ consistent<br>!named Token Site | NTS | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| ACK      | named Token Site<br>OrderingQ consistent   | PT  | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| ACK      | Token passed<br>named Token Site           | TS  | Pass-Token<br>Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ |
| ACK      | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed      | GP  | ass-Token<br>Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ  |
| Conf     | !OrderingQ consistent<br>Timestamp >=      | NTS | Update-OrderingQ                                       |
| Failure  | Last token pass<br>Timestamp               |     |  |
| RecStart | (none)                                     | SR  | Multicast RecStart                                     |
|          | (none)                                     | SV  | Unicast RecVote to<br>Reform Site                      |

#### Not Token Site State Table

| Event | Condition(s)                               | State | Action(s)  |
|-------|--|-------|--|
| Data  | (none)                                     | NTS   | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ              |
| NMD   | (none)                                     | NTS   | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ              |
| LCR   | none)                                      | NTS   | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ              |
| NL    | !named Token Site                          | NTS   | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ                |
| NL    | named Token Site<br>OrderingQ consistent   | PT    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ                |
| NL    | Token passed<br>named Token Site           | TS    | Pass-Token<br>Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ  |
| NL    | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed      | GP    | Pass-Token<br>Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ  |
| ACK   | !OrderingQ consistent<br>!named Token Site | NTS   | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| ACK   | named Token Site<br>OrderingQ consistent   | PT    | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| ACK   | Token passed<br>named Token Site           | TS    | Pass-Token<br>Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ |
| ACK   | OrderingQ consistent                       |       |  |

|          |                                   |    |                                    |
|----------|-----------------------------------|----|------------------------------------|
| ACK      | !Token passed<br>named Token Site | GP | Pass-Token<br>Add ACK to OrderingQ |
| Failure  | !OrderingQ consistent             |    | Update-OrderingQ                   |
| RecStart | (none)                            | SR | Multicast RecStart                 |
|          | (none)                            | SV | Unicast RecVote to<br>Reform Site  |
| CommitNL | NL does not contain LR            |    | Schedule MandLv<br>site            |

### Getting Packets State Table

| Event | Condition(s)                          | State | Action(s)   |
|-------|---------------------------------------|-------|---|
| Data  | OrderingQ consistent<br>Token passed  | PT    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token |
| Data  | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed | TS    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token |
| Data  | !OrderingQ consistent                 | GP    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| NMD   | OrderingQ consistent<br>Token passed  | PT    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token |
| NMD   | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed | TS    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token |
| NMD   | !OrderingQ consistent                 | GP    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| LCR   | (none)                                | GP    | place packet in DataQ<br>Update-OrderingQ               |
| ACK   | OrderingQ consistent<br>Token passed  | PT    | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token  |
| ACK   | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed | TS    | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token  |
| ACK   | !OrderingQ consistent                 | GP    | Add ACK to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ                |
| NL    | OrderingQ consistent<br>Token passed  | PT    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token   |
| NL    | OrderingQ consistent<br>!Token passed | TS    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ<br>Pass-Token   |
| NL    | !OrderingQ consistent                 | GP    | Add NL to OrderingQ<br>Update-OrderingQ                 |

|          |        |    |                                |
|----------|--------|----|--------------------------------|
| Failure  | (none) | SR | Multicast RecStart             |
| RecStart | (none) | SV | Unicast RecVote to Reform Site |

## II. Test Suite Generated for RMP Normal Operations

Path 1: 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 8

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> NTS

Path 2: 1 -> 2 -> 4 -> 9 -> 13 -> 36

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> NTS

NTS @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

Path 3: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 14 -> 37

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ TPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ TPA ) --> PT

Path 4: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 15 -> 38

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ CTPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ CTPA ) --> TS

Path 5: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 16

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 6: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 17

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )

Path 7: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 47 -> 62

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ TPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ TPA ) --> PT

Path 8: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 48 -> 63

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS

TS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ CTPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ CTPA ) --> TS

Path 9: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 49

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 10: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 50

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )

Path 11: 1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 19

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS  
TS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 12: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 20 -> 42 -> 51 -> 66

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
PT @ CFM when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ CFM ) --> NTS  
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

Path 13: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 21

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 14: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 22

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 15: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 23

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 16: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 24

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 17: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 52

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ CFM when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ CFM )

Path 18: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 53 -> 67

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA ) --> PT

Path 19: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 54

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )

Path 20: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 55

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )

Path 21: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 56

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )

Path 22: 1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 26

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 23: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 27 -> 44

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> GP

Path 24: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 28

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 25: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 29

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )

Path 26: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 30

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 27: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 31 -> 45 -> 57 -> 68

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ CFM when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ CFM ) --> NTS

Path 28: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 31 -> 45 -> 58

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) --> PT  
 PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 29: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 59 -> 69

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> GP

Path 30: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 60

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )

Path 31: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 61

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )

Path 32: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 33

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
 NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
 GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

Path 33: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 34

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS

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NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )

Path 34: 1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 35

NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) --> NTS  
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> GP  
GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )

## **APPROVAL OF EXAMINING COMMITTEE**

This problem report for the Master of Science degree  
by *Yunqing Wu* has been approved for  
the Department of Statistics and Computer Science by

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Jack Callahan, Chair

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Murali Sitaraman, Ph.D.

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Raghu Karinithi, Ph.D.

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Date



